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PARENTAL AUTHORITY. THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW. By
Julius Cohen, Reginald A. H. Robson, and Alan Bates. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1958. Pp. xii, 301. $6.00.
This book reports a cross-disciplinary research project which should
be of particular interest to lawyers and sociologists, so far as theory, tech-
nique, and methodology are concerned, and to legislators and the public
generally, as to the substance of the findings. The research group (I would
have used the word "team" if it had not recently fallen into disrepute) con-
sisted of a law professor and two sociologists. The data were collected in a field
study in which the questionnaire-interview method was employed in an effort
to ascertain the extent to which the law, in a limited area of human relations
with which most laymen have a working familiarity, coincides with or
deviates from the "moral sense of the community."
Many of the present and some of the immediate past generation of legal
scholars have reacted positively-and sometimes violently-to the arid deduc-
tions of analytical jurisprudence and to what they regard as the sterile
speculations of the metaphysical jurists. The "moderns"-if this is a per-
missible term in this context-have insisted both on a realism that cuts
through the logic and formalism of the law to uncover the social policy that
is supposed to underlie it, and also on an examination of the factual con-
stituents of the social and legal order upon which that policy is supposed
to rest. They not only recognize but emphasize the fact that the law grows-
or at least changes-as life itself grows and changes. They also recognize,
of course, that there is a law of inertia-a legal lag-in the sense that law
will always be somewhat behind much progressive social thinking as well as
ahead of the thinking of those committed to what was once the status quo.
Law as the conservator of social values must protect the values confirmed
by experience in addition to those evolving in a fast-changing society.
In a democratic community, law is a mirror of a way of life. But it
reflects that life with varying degrees of accuracy. There is always some
distortion. A political party conducts a successful campaign on a platform,
and the "people"--whoever they are-give it a "mandate." Much of the
mandate is in such general terms, however, that there is considerable latitude
for interpretation. Moreover, it is seldom, if ever, that a political party
keeps-or tries to keep-all of its specific promises. Similarly, after a judge
is appointed or elected it is seldom that his point of view does not change-
or appear to change-so that his decisions disappoint his conservative sup-
porters or his liberal sponsors or both.
But there may be something that can be called a "consensus," capable
of being employed as a normative standard for all law, and comparable,
perhaps, to the standard of the "ordinary reasonably prudent man" in the
law of negligence. Should the law be what it is? Would a reasonable man
act as this man did? There is a sense of "oughtness," which is conditioned,
of course, by the common experiences of men in a particular culture, with
its values, mores, superstitions-a moral tone with which law, if it is not
strictly attuned, cannot be too discordant. Whether it is labeled a "sense
of justice," a "sense of injustice," "public opinion," or "received ideals of
time and space," it should be examined, analyzed, and studied. This is not
necessarily to say that law in every respect and detail should conform to
the average morality of the community. Indeed this study disclosed a con-
siderable variance between the two. Nor does it mean that the boundaries
of the "community" may not vary with respect to different laws. For
example, the people of the State of Arkansas might well constitute the "com-
munity" to reflect the norm for determining the grounds for divorce, but
not for determining the permissibility of segregation in schools.
Julius Cohen and his colleagues have sought to demonstrate a method
of investigating this "moral sense" of the "community." To be sure, the
techniques involved are not new. They have been used by social scientists
in many contexts. They are used here, however, in a highly imaginative
way and for a unique purpose, namely, to assess the moral sense of the
community with respect to the rules of family law which regulate the rela-
tions between parent and child.
There are different terms in which the moral sense of the community
can be assessed. It might be defined either in terms of what the community
actually does, or what it thinks it ought to do. As the authors point out,
the former approach has been adopted by a number of moderns, including
Underhill Moore, Kinsey and his collaborators, Ehrlich, Jacobbs and Angell,
Llewellyn, and others. In the words of the authors, "in all these studies
the sights were on the 'is' or the 'was' side of the behavior pattern."1 Bor-
rowing Northrop's phrase, they say that the emphasis of these scholars was
on the "normative 'is' of the living law,"2 and they point out that the focal
point of their study is also a normative "is," but the "is" of the community's
feeling of what the law ought to be rather than the "is" of the living law.
"With Ehrlich," they say, "it was the 'actual practice of the community,'
and not its abstract moral standard that was sought. With us it was the






This is certainly a worthwhile objective. It is an investigation into the
ideals of a society-into its objectives, its goals; and it is certainly more
difficult in an empirical study to attempt to discover, with any degree of
confidence in the results, what a community thinks it ought to do than to
investigate and analyze what it does. And while a community, like an
individual, frequently fails to live up to the standard it sets for itself, this
would be a sorrier world than it is if its ideals were no higher than its achieve-
ments.
The "community" studied was the adult population of the State of
Nebraska, excluding inmates of mental institutions, prisons, and reformatories.
A trained staff of interviewers was used to find the views of a stratified
random sample consisting of 860 respondents, or approximately one out of
every thousand qualified adults in the state.
The criteria for stratification were selected on the basis of what may
be assumed to be factors relevant to the subject under investigation. They
included residential area (rural or urban), race, nationality, income bracket,
occupation, religion, education, marital status, and number and age of children,
among others. Twenty-two counties of the state were selected at random
on the basis of these socio-economic criteria. On the whole, the entire pro-
cedure appears to be consistent with the best principles of scientific random
samplying. The basic data are tabulated and included in the text where
convenient, and otherwise in the appendices.
Some of the findings of this study will surprise those who make guesses.
For example:
The majority of the community feels that the law should restrict
parental control over children in a substantially greater number of
ways than the law actually does at the present time.
The majority of the community feels that the law should grant
pre-adolescent chilldren freedom from parental control in more areas
than the law in fact does.
This last-mentioned community view is even more marked when
the child reaches the later stages of adolescence. From the age of
18 years, the majority of the community feels that the law should
permit the child to have rights in a considerably greater number of
situations than at the present time.
The majority of the community feels that the law should recog-
nize a gradual transition during the period of adolescence from
childhood to adulthood by assigning the child an increasing number of
rights and obligations, rather than make an abrupt change at the age
of 21 from childhood to full adulthood, as the law does at the
present time.4
The above represents the core of what the authors investigated and




about the community which are of significance for social scientists. Aside
from the central problems involved, here are some collateral questions to
which answers were obtained: Are men more willing than women to have
the law restrict parental control over children? Are men more willing than
women to have the law grant autonomy to the child? Do men agree with
women on the question of familial versus governmental financial responsi-
bility for indigent family members? The same questions are answered with
regard to Protestants and Catholics, younger people and older people, college
people and non-college people, low-income people and high-income people,
different occupational classes, and parents and childless people.
The findings made by these scholars throw considerable doubt on the
widely held sociological and juristic theory that law is the resultant of the
clash of interests of different pressure groups in the community. The theory
may be sound in some areas, but there is no substantial evidence in this study
that it is relevant to the field of law under investigation.
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THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW. By Harold J. Berman. Brooklyn:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1958. Pp. 662. $7.50.
Sporadic efforts, in a few American colleges, to make "Law" an integral
part of the liberal arts curriculum have been hampered by the lack of an
appropriate published text. "Materials" have been put together here and
there, most usefully by a group at the Law School of the University of Wis-
consin ;' but Dean Garrison and Professor Hurst were the advance guard, and
their compilation of readings and cases was published in a cumbersome and
expensive format. In fact, the notion that undergraduates, in the course of
a proper general education, should have the opportunity to become acquainted
with the legal and judicial process just as readily as they may learn about
the "law" of supply and demand or Boyle's Law2 is still comparatively novel
in this country. One reason for its failure to spread more rapidly is, I think,
the burden it puts on the instructor. That burden is now greatly diminished
by the appearance of Professor Berman's book.
Another obstacle to giving a nonprofessional law course for college
juniors and seniors is the contemporary trend in the social sciences, away
1. GARRIsoN, Hutsr, AuEFACH & MEiuN, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1956).
2. See Freund, Law and the Universities, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 367.
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